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NOTES
A JURY OF ONE'S PEERS: VIRGINIA'S RESTORATION OF
RIGHTS PROCESS AND ITS DISPROPORTIONATE EFFECT
ON THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, an African American male, brought an action
against the defendant, a white male, for alleged injuries sustained
when the defendant's car collided with the plaintiffs car. During
voir dire, the judge asked the prospective jurors if any of them had
been convicted of a felony. The only African American member in
the jury pool looked inquisitive as he slowly raised his hand, and he
explained to the judge that he had been convicted of a felony ten
years ago. With a sympathetic look on his face, the judge dismissed
the prospective juror and explained that under Virginia law all
convicted felons are excluded from serving on any jury unless their
civil rights have been restored by the state.'
Under current Virginia law, convicted felons permanently lose
their civil rights unless they apply for, and are granted, a restora-
tion of those rights by the State.2 These rights include, among
others, the right to vote,3 the right to hold public office,4 and the
1. This fictionalized story is based on actual courtroom events that occurred in
Virginia's Ninth Circuit Court located in Williamsburg, Virginia, on September 10, 2003.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-23.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (requiring the Director of the
Department of Corrections to notify convicted felons of their loss of civil rights as well as the
process required to restore those rights).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-427 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (noting that those convicted of
a felony are disqualified to vote).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-231 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (noting that those convicted of
a felony are disqualified from holding public office or serving as a political appointee).
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right to serve on a jury.' The Governor has the sole authority to
restore a felon's civil rights.6 In the summer of 2002, Governor
Warner instituted an expedited review process for those convicted
of non-violent felonies applying for a restoration of their civil
rights.7 Although the new process has enabled more convicted felons
to regain their civil rights,8 the blanket denial of civil rights to
convicted felons who have finished serving their sentence has a
significant impact on jury trials, particularly those involving
African Americans.
One in four African American males in Virginia is a convicted
felon,' without the right to serve on a jury. This demonstrates that
the exclusion of felons from service on both civil and criminal
juries prevents a significant number of African American males
in Virginia from representing a fair cross-section of their commu-
nity in the jury pool.' ° As a result, Virginia's restoration of rights
process, although neutral on its face, disparately impacts the
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-338 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (describing the persons who are
disqualified from serving as jurors, including persons who have been convicted of a felony).
6. VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (stating that the power to grant pardons and remove political
disabilities resides solely within the authority of the Governor); see also In re Phillips, 574
S.E.2d 270, 273 (Va. 2003) (noting that the power to restore a felon's rights resides in the
Governor and this power is separate and distinct from the other branches of government).
7. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Application for Restoration of Rights for Certain Non-
violent Offenders, available at httpJ//www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/Clemency/RORShort
App.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Application for Restoration ofRights]; see also
Laurence Hammack, Governor Helps Felons Regain Civil Rights, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS (Virginia), May 10, 2004, at 31.
8. See Hammack, supra note 7, at B1 (noting that under the new restoration of rights
process that distinguishes between non-violent and violent felonies, Governor Warner has
restored the rights to more convicted felons than the previous three governors combined).
9. Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Restore Your Right to Vote in
Virginia, available at http://www.lawyerscomm.org/ep04/50states/virginia.pdf (last visited
Feb. 2, 2005) (noting that twenty-five percent of black men in Virginia are disenfranchised)
[hereinafter Restore Your Right to Vote]; see also Felons File Lawsuit to Challenge Vote Law,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 31, 2002 at B2. Five African American males convicted of
a felony have challenged the Virginia law that excludes them from voting, arguing that the
law is unconstitutional because it disproportionately deprives African Americans of their
voting rights. Id.
10. See Robert Joe Lee, Minority Issues in Jury Management, for the Committee on
Minority Access to Justice, Supreme Court Task Force on Minority Concerns 9 (Sept. 1991)
(finding that "[tihe combined effects of certain qualifications ... are that up to about one-half
of each minority group is excluded from jury service" and that if the jury pool does not
contain an "acceptable range of the proportion of minorities in the general population, there
may be de facto discrimination").
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African American community and may deprive an accused African
American of his right to be tried by a jury of his peers in a criminal
trial.
This Note will explore the restoration of civil rights process and
its effect on the jury system in Virginia, particularly on the African
American community. Part I discusses the creation of the Anglo-
American jury and the development of the jury system in America,
and it also discusses the important Supreme Court rulings that
shape jury composition and the ways in which the State is permit-
ted to exclude prospective jury members. Following the history of
the American jury, Part II explains the Supreme Court's fair cross-
section requirement for jury representation. Part III analyzes
Virginia's restoration of civil rights process by describing the policy
as it currently exists and comparing it with proposed legislation,
which would have eased the restoration of voting rights process
for those convicted of non-violent felonies. Part IV provides a
national overview of felony exclusion laws that prohibit felons from
serving as jurors, using Virginia as a benchmark. This Part also
offers policy arguments against these laws. Part V outlines the
arguments for and against Virginia's current policy in the context
of both criminal and civil cases. In addition, this Part analyzes the
treatment of drug offenders and evaluates specifically how it
burdens the African American community. Part VI highlights the
constitutional concerns that underlie Virginia's restoration of civil
rights process and its effect on the jury system. Specifically, this
Part addresses three constitutional issues: the Sixth Amendment's
jury of one's peers requirement, the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process requirement that laws be racially neutral, and the right to
privacy found in the Ninth Amendment, in the context of the
requirement that a felon disclose his felony status before being
eligible to serve on a jury. In conclusion, this Note proposes that
legislation should be enacted that would make all felons eligible to
apply for a restoration of their civil rights immediately upon
completion of their sentence, using the expedited process for non-
violent felons set forth in the current restoration of rights policy.
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I. HISTORY OF THE JURY SYSTEM
The Anglo-American jury system has its roots in the Magna
Carta, which was signed by the King of England in 1215.1" Prior to
the implementation of the Magna Carta, the King served as the
head of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern-
ment.12 Mounting dissension to the King's tyrannical oppression led
the barons of England to draft the Magna Carta, which prohibited
the King from punishing anyone unless the individual had been
judged by a jury of his peers.'" Firmly rooted in this English
tradition, the right to a trial by jury was adhered to in America
after settlement of the colonies.' 4 Indeed, in 1606, the Governor of
Virginia declared by royal decree that all criminal defendants in the
colony would be tried by jury.'5
A. The American Colonies and the Jury System
According to historian J.R. Pole, the early Anglo-American jury
served as a practical and economically efficient tool of the govern-
ment in judicial proceedings.' 6 Juries provided a way for members
of the community to come together to set community standards, to
create a standard of morality, and to instill loyalty to one's commu-
nity. ' In colonial America, juries often acted as a form of resistance
against the King. Jurors held democratic power over the law
imposed upon them, because the King could not decide whether the
11. See LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAYON THE TRIAL BYJURY 1 (The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. 2002) (expounding upon the long-standing right ofjuries to judge the accused).
12. Id. at 20 (noting that judges were servants of the King).
13. See id. at 21-22 (explaining that the Magna Carta required the "consent of the peers"
of the accused before the King could pronounce a punishment).
14. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF TRIAL BY JURY 66
(1999) (commenting that the charters of Virginia and other colonies afforded colonists the
same rights as Englishmen).
15. Id.
16. J.R. Pole, "A Quest of Thoughts": Representation and Moral Agency in the Early
Anglo-American Jury, in "THE DEAREST BIRTH RIGHT OFTHE PEOPLE OFENGLAND": THE JURY
IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 101, 102 (John W. Cairns & Grant McLeod eds., 2002)
(noting that juries "nourished loyalty" of community members).
17. See id. (explaining the power ofjuries to mitigate or enhance the law).
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jury would originate prosecutions, where the trial would be, or who
would serve as the jury.18 The First Continental Congress declared
in 1774 that the colonies and their inhabitants were "entitled ... to
the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers." 9
A few years later, the Declaration of Independence condemned
the King's control over the colonies' judicial system through his
appointment of judges and his denial of "the benefit of trial by
jury. "20
B. Establishing the American Jury System
In establishing the American judicial system, the newly formed
nation grappled with issues of impartiality and locality with respect
to juries when formulating the Constitution and deciding rules of
criminal procedure. 21 Specifically, Anti-Federalists argued that a
local jury would be more familiar with the location in which a crime
occurred and also would know the general character of the
accused.22 A local jury with personal knowledge, therefore, would be
able to serve as a better judge than a jury foreign to the location
and to the criminal defendant. 23 Federalists, however, argued that
local representation in making laws would be satisfied in the
formation of Congress and state legislatures. 24 A local jury would
not be needed to interpret the law based on community norms, as
was necessary when the colonists were under British control and
18. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 25 (1994) (describing juries, "in moments of crisis," as having "the last say on
what the law was in their community"); see also RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 5-6 (1980) (noting thatjuries served as a "symbol of rebellion" against the
King).
19. SIMON, supra note 18, at 5 (describing the colonists' recognition of a trial by jury to
be a fundamental right).
20. Id. at 6.
21. See ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at 22-33 (highlighting the fundamental arguments
debated between the Anti-Federalists, who preferred local juries to ensure impartiality, and
the Federalists, who argued local juries would be biased due to the likelihood of the jurors
knowing the parties at trial or knowing the issues on trial).
22. Id. at 27 (focusing on jurors as fact finders).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 33 (arguing that locally elected legislatures would create laws fair and
reflective of the community).
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the jury served as the colonists' only form of representative
government.25
The Federalists and Anti-Federalists compromised on the issue
of locality in creating what is now the Sixth Amendment.26 The
Amendment requires criminal defendants to be tried by a jury
located in "the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed."" Federalists, who initially opposed the idea of a local
jury, retained the language in the Sixth Amendment requiring the
accused to be tried in districts created by the federal Judiciary
Act.2" However, Anti-Federalists achieved a victory for local juries,
as jury members had to be chosen from the districts where the
crime occurred, and Congress could not expand the districts to a
size larger than a state.29 Being tried by a jury composed of local
citizens, therefore, eventually became accepted as the defendant's
best hope for an impartial trial.
C. Issues with Jury Representation for African Americans and
Women
In addition to the issues of locality and impartiality, the nation
wrestled with the question of jury representation and who consti-
tuted "one's peers." Historically, women and African Americans
were excluded from jury service.3" Following the Civil War, African
American men became eligible for jury service based on the passage
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, but
southern states continued to deny them their right to serve on a
25. Id. (noting the difference between an elected legislature and a King).
26. Id. at 35-36 (compromising on local juries by allowing Congress to select the
geographic boundary from which ajuror would be selected, but limiting the boundary to each
individual state in existence at that time).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. See ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at 35 (noting the true victory of the Anti-Federalists,
as the Constitution limited Congress's authority to create districts larger than a state).
29. Id. at 36. The Judiciary Act highlighted the importance of local juries as it required
juries to be selected from the county where the crime was committed, if the crime carried a
possible punishment of death. Id.
30. For a discussion on all-white juries prior to the Supreme Court's requirement that
a fair cross-section of the community be pooled for jury service, see ABRAMSON, supra note
18, at 105-07. For a discussion on the exclusion of women from juries, see id. at 112-15.
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jury until the middle of the twentieth century.3' Most women did
not receive the right to serve on a jury until the early twentieth
century.32
D. The Supreme Court and Jury Representation
By the end of Reconstruction, with the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment requiring "equal protection of the laws,"3 courts had
to decide how the Amendment would affect notions of fairness and
representation for newly freed African Americans on trial, who had
to be tried by a jury of their "peers."34 One possibility was for courts
to require that, in criminal trials, at least some jurors must be the
same race as the defendant. For instance, prior to the United States
receiving its independence, a colonial Massachusetts court decided
that a jury of one's peers for a Native American accused of a crime
should include Native Americans;35 consequently, the court allowed
a jury composed of six Native Americans and six Englishmen to try
the Native American defendant.36 Another possibility was for the
courts to construe the "jury of one's peers" requirement to mean
only that criminal defendants are entitled to request a trial by jury
rather than having a bench trial. Not until its decision in Strauder
v. West Virginia3' did the Supreme Court finally address the issue
31. SIMON, supra note 18, at 7 (noting that juries in the South consistently decided
against African Americans, whether they were the accused or the victim of crime).
32. ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at 113. The first state to allow women to serve on juries
was Utah, in 1898. Id. After the Nineteenth Amendment was passed in 1920, many states
allowed women to serve as jurors; however, a majority of states did not qualify women to
serve until 1940. Id.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring states to apply the laws equally to all
citizens).
34. See Pole, supra note 16, at 110 (commenting on the racial element of defining "peers"
during Reconstruction).
35. See id. (noting that aliens and other societal groups that lacked political
representation had a need for representation in the jury).
36. Id. In a perhaps odd sense of justice, Native Americans were treated as aliens
without representation in government. Although the Native Americans could be held to laws
that they were not permitted to participate in creating, juries could include Native
Americans to "represent" Native Americans on trial. Id.
37. 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that a state statute that facially discriminated against
African Americans to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
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of what constitutes a representative jury with respect to African
Americans.
In Strauder, the Court held that a jury of one's peers is a jury
where the members hold the same legal status within the commu-
nity as that of the accused.3" The defendant in Strauder, an African
American male, appealed his murder conviction, objecting to the
circuit court's denial of removal to federal court where African
Americans would be eligible for jury service."s West Virginia law
denied African Americans the ability to serve on a jury, which the
defendant claimed would deny him equal protection of the law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 ° The Court stated that
the West Virginia law singled out African Americans, branding
them as inferior.4' Expounding upon the basic premise of ajury, the
Court concluded that a jury is composed of individuals with the
same rights as the accused; thus, by denying African Americans the
ability to serve on a jury in the defendant's trial, the defendant did
not receive a trial by a jury comprised of his peers.42 Consequently,
the state had denied the defendant equal protection under the
law.
43
In Strauder, the Supreme Court determined that the state could
not systematically deny African Americans the right to serve on a
jury,44 but it limited the application of Strauder in its decision in
38. Id. at 308 ("The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals
of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine.").
39. Id. at 304. A former slave, the defendant believed he would not receive the "full and
equal" protection of the law if tried in a state court. Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; see also Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304. After the state court
denied the defendant's petition for removal to a federal court, the defendant made several
motions to quash the venire, all of which the state court denied. Id.
41. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. Specifically, the Court stated:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a
statute all right to participate ... as jurors ... is practically a brand upon them[,]
... an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which
is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which
the law aims to secure to all others.
Id.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 308-10 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit states from
qualifying jurors on non-racial grounds).
44. See id. at 309 (determining that states cannot qualify jurors on the basis of race).
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Virginia v. Rives.45 In Rives, the Court analyzed Virginia's jury
system and its exclusion of African Americans from serving as
jurors under the Fourteenth Amendment.46 In Rives, the defen-
dants, African American males, petitioned to have their all-white
jury modified so that one-third of the jury would be composed of
African Americans. 7 The state court denied the defendants' request
and later denied the defendants' petition for a change of venue to
federal court.4 At the time of the trial, the Commonwealth of
Virginia allowed "all male citizens twenty-one years of age and not
over sixty, who are entitled to vote and hold office under the
Constitution" to serve as jurors.4" Because Virginia did not specifi-
cally prohibit African Americans from serving as jurors, the Court
found that Virginia did not explicitly exclude them from serving as
jury members, despite the fact that no African Americans had
served on the defendants' jury.5 ° Therefore, the Court held that the
defendants did not prove that the Commonwealth had denied them
equal protection of the laws.5' Even though the defendants'jury had
no African American members and the county in which the trial
took place had never allowed an African American to serve as ajury
member when an African American stood as the accused, the Court
found that the defendants "fleill short of showing that any civil
right was denied, or that there had been any discrimination against
the defendants because of their color or race."52
45. 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (holding that if a state law requires racial impartiality for jury
selection, the fact that no member of an accused's race serves on the jury does not create a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 314-15.
48. Id. at 315-16 (describing the state court's refusal to empanel a new jury or remove
the case to a federal court).
49. Id. at 320. Although the statute did not explicitly deny African Americans the right
to serve on a jury, the statute's juror qualifications likely would have the effect of eliminating
African American jurors. Many southern states required literacy tests or poll taxes as a
condition to vote in an attempt to prohibit African Americans from voting, and consequently,
from serving on juries.
50. Id. at 320-21. The Court notes that if the defendants could show that a state official
limited juror selection to whites, this would be a violation of the Virginia statute and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
51. Id. at 322 (noting that the defendants had a right to an impartially selected jury, not
the right to a jury composed of members of their own race).
52. Id. (finding that the jury "may have been impartially selected").
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The defendant in Strauder experienced de jure discrimination,
as West Virginia specifically denied African Americans the ability
to serve on a jury. 53 The defendants in Rives, however, experienced
de facto discrimination with respect to jury composition, because
the Commonwealth had not specifically denied members of the
defendants' race from serving on juries, even though no jury
member from the defendants' race served on the defendants' jury.54
At the turn of the twentieth century, therefore, the Supreme Court
decided that when states specifically bar African Americans from
serving as jury members, the states denied African Americans
equal protection under the laws. However, the Court allowed states
to discriminate in selecting juries by de facto means, such that
states could discriminate as to who could serve on a jury in a
manner that would adversely affect African Americans, without
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
II. THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT
Almost one hundred years following the decisions in Strauder55
and Rives, 6 the Supreme Court reconsidered the issue of jury
representation. In Taylor v. Louisiana,57 the Court held that jury
pools must be "reasonably representative" of the accused's commu-
nity in order to protect the accused's Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.5" Elaborating on those rights, the Court declared that
a jury must be "drawn from a fair cross section of the community."59
53. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879).
54. See Rives, 100 U.S. at 320-21.
55. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303.
56. Rives, 100 U.S. at 313.
57. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be tried by
ajury of his peers was violated due to a state statute that excluded women from the jury pool
unless women volunteered to serve as jurors).
58. Id. at 538 (noting that juries do not have to be representative of a fair cross-section
of the community, but must be selected from such).
59. Id. at 527 (holding the fair cross-section requirement necessary to the concept of trial
by jury).
2118 [Vol. 46:2109
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The Court created further substance to its finding in Taylor a few
years later in Duren v. Missouri.0
A. Underrepresented Juries and Statistics
In Duren, the defendant appealed his conviction, claiming that he
did not have a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity.6' In 1979, Missouri was one of two states that excluded women
from jury service if they requested not to serve.62 At the time of the
trial, women made up fifty-four percent of the adult population in
the defendant's county, but less than fifteen percent of the female
population had been summoned to appear for voir dire.63
In its opinion, the Court laid out a three-prong test that a
defendant must satisfy to establish a prima facie violation of the
fair cross-section requirement:
(1) [T]hat the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in
venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury-selection process.'
60. 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (holding the state's automatic exemption of women who did not
want to serve on ajury a violation of the defendant's right to ajury selected from a fair cross-
section of the community).
61. Id. at 360. Interestingly, the defendant did not claim that someone of his own race
or gender was excluded from the jury pool. Rather, the defendant claimed that by excluding
women from the jury pool, the state denied him of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
62. Id. at 359-60 (noting that Tennessee also excluded from jury service women who
requested not to serve).
63. Id. at 362. The defendant submitted statistical reports on the percentage of females
serving as jury members during the ten months prior to his trial. The defendant calculated
the percentage by using population census data collected six years prior to his trial. See id.
at 362-63. The Missouri Supreme Court contended that due to the age of the census data, the
statistical reports may not have accurately reflected the percentage of women eligible to
serve as jury members at the time of the defendant's trial. Id. at 363. However, the court
concluded that even if the statistics were accurate, the Missouri system still met
constitutional requirements. Id.
64. Id. at 364.
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The Court found that the defendant had met this burden, relying
largely upon statistical data.65 First, the Court noted that they
previously had acknowledged, in Taylor, that women were a distinct
group in the community.6 Second, the defendant demonstrated
through census reports the percentage of women within the
community.6 As the defendant showed that women composed over
half of the county's population, the Court concluded that women
were not represented in a reasonable manner, because only
approximately fifteen percent of women had been summoned and
appeared for voir dire.68 Finally, the Court found that the large
discrepancy between the female population of the county and the
composition of juries, which had been consistent for at least ten
months prior to the defendant's trial, showed that "the cause of the
underrepresentation was systematic-that is, inherent in the
particular jury-selection process utilized."69
As the defendant had met his burden of showing a prima facie
case of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the burden
shifted to the State of Missouri to show that meeting the fair cross-
section requirement would impinge upon a "significant state
interest." ° Because the state could not prove that any permissible
jury exemptions caused the underrepresentation, the automatic
exemption for women appeared to be the only viable cause.7' The
state claimed that most women served as caretakers for their
children and that the state had an interest in protecting the role
65. Id. at 364-70. The defendant satisfied the last two prongs of the three-prong test to
prove a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement using statistical data.
66. Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975)).
67. Id. (finding the "percentage of the community" the alleged underrepresented group
comprises to be the "conceptual benchmark for the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
requirement").
68. Id. at 365-66 (commenting that if the percentage of women in the community was
accurately mirrored in the composition ofjury pools, more than one out of every two jurors
should be women, but that in actuality only one out of every six jurors were women).
69. Id. at 366 (finding that "85% of the average jury was male").
70. Id. at 368. The state argued that more women than men possibly could qualify for
permissible exemptions from jury service. Id. Possible exemptions included being over the
age of sixty-five or working as a teacher or government worker. Id. The state, however, could
not prove that these permissible exemptions from jury service caused the discrepancy
between the number of women in the population and those actually serving on juries. Id. at
368-69.
71. Id. at 368-69 (noting that the state must offer proof that the permissive exemptions
caused the underrepresentation of women on juries).
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of women in the home.72 The Court, however, found that the
automatic exemption of women was overinclusive, as not all women
had "domestic responsibilities."73 The overinclusive nature of the
automatic exemption of women, therefore, did not meet constitu-
tional muster, as it violated the fair cross-section requirement.74
B. Constitutional Standards and Jury Representation
The Supreme Court has articulated important constitutional
standards with respect to juries and representation since the end
of the Civil War. First, the Court has held that de jure discrimina-
tion in jury composition is unconstitutional." In Strauder, the
Court stated that a criminal defendant has the right to a jury
composed of his peers, defining peers as those members of the
community that hold the same legal status as the accused."6 When
the State deliberately denies the right to serve as a jury member to
a particular segment of the community with the same legal status
as the accused, the State violates the defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws." Second, the
Court is willing to allow de facto discrimination with respect to jury
composition.78 In Rives, even though no member of the defendant's
race served as a member of his jury, the Court held that the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated.79
Because the Commonwealth had not purposefully denied African
Americans the ability to serve on a jury, the lack of African
72. Id. at 369 ("[Tlhe only state interest advanced by the exemption is safeguarding the
important role played by women in home and family life.").
73. Id (excluding all women because of the domestic responsibilities of a few did not
justify the gross underrepresentation of women within the jury pool).
74. Id. at 370. But see id. at 374-75 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
"is simply playing a constitutional numbers game" and that there is no essential difference
between a jury in which fifteen percent of the members are women and a jury in which
twenty or thirty percent of the members are women).
75. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that states may not
explicitly exclude African Americans from serving as jurors).
76. Id. at 308 (finding that a jury must be composed of the accused's peers).
77. See id. at 309-10 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
discrimination based on race).
78. See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1879).
79. Id. (finding that the jury was composed pursuant to a neutral law).
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American jurors did not indicate a violation of the defendant's
rights .80
Finally, the Court has held that juries must be selected from a
fair cross-section of the community,8' and that if a specific portion
of the community is underrepresented in jury composition, the
defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights may be
violated. 2 In Duren, the defendant showed that the state automati-
cally exempted women from jury service upon request, resulting in
a dramatic underrepresentation of women serving on juries." The
defendant proved the case of underrepresentation through the use
of statistics, which the Court accepted as a legitimate way to prove
the lack of a fair cross-section of the community. 4 As the state
offered no legitimate interest in systematically excluding women
from jury service, the Court held the automatic exemption unconsti-
tutional.85 These principles enunciated by the Supreme Court
regarding de facto and de jure discrimination in jury selection and
regarding the fair cross-section requirement may indicate that
Virginia's current restoration of civil rights process may not meet
constitutional muster, because it disparately impacts African
American males and systematically denies those convicted of
felonies from being eligible for jury selection.
III. VIRGINIA'S CURRENT RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS PROCESS
AND ITS EFFECT ON JURY SELECTION
Virginia's restoration of civil rights process is part of the Common-
wealth's felony disenfranchisement laws, which deny civil rights to
citizens convicted of felonies. 6 Felony disenfranchisement laws
80. Id.; see also Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1906) (holding that a defendant
has a right to be tried by a jury that is selected according to nondiscriminatory standards,
but that a defendant does not have a right to be tried by a jury partially or wholly composed
ofjurors from his same race).
81. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1975).
82. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1979) (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526-31,
538).
83. Id. at 366.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 368-70.
86. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53.1-231.1 to 231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (describing the
process by which felons are notified of their loss of civil rights and the process by which
felons may apply for the right to vote).
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made their way into colonial America through the British practice
of adding civil punishments to the criminal sanctions imposed on
those convicted of felonies.87 The additional civil punishment of
being denied the right to participate in the political process
extended from the belief that those convicted of felonies were less
trustworthy and more capable of fraud. 8 Disenfranchisement laws
"increased in importance and effect" in America following the Civil
War." At the start of the twenty-first century, all but two states
disenfranchised felons in some form or another, with twelve states
permanently disenfranchising "at least some ex-felons." s°
In 1998, the Human Rights Watch's Sentencing Project released
its report on felon disenfranchisement laws in the United States.9 '
The report highlighted the disproportionate racial impact created
by state disenfranchisement laws, listing Virginia as one of five
states with laws that permanently disenfranchise one out of every
four African American men.9 2 After Virginia's disenfranchisement
laws and their racial impact received national attention, the
Virginia Black Caucus, led by chairman Delegate Jerrauld Jones,
pushed for new legislation "to ease the process felons must go
through to regain their voting rights."93 Although killed in commit-
tee when first introduced, 4 the General Assembly enacted new
legislation in 2000 to amend the restoration of civil rights process
87. Martine J. Price, Note and Comment, Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement:
Legislation vs. Litigation, 11 J.L. & POLY 369, 370 (2002) (noting that the English practice
of "imposing collateral civil consequences to felony convictions" was continued in America).
88. Id. at 370-71 (justifying the disenfranchisement laws as a way to decrease fraud by
keeping felons away from the political process).
89. Id. at 369 (highlighting that this practice continues today with the same level of
enthusiasm).
90. See id. at 371-74 (commenting that twelve states allow for the permanent
disenfranchisement of"at least some ex-felons, even after sentence and parole completion").
91. Human Rights Watch & The Sentencing Project, Losing the Vote: The Impact of
Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States (1998), available at http://www.hrw.
org/reports98/vote/index.html (providing a state-by-state breakdown of felony
disenfranchisement laws) [hereinafter Losing the Vote].
92. Id. at pt. III. In addition to Virginia, one out of every four African American men is
permanently disenfranchised due to a felony conviction in Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico and
Wyoming. See Losing the Vote, supra note 91.
93. Ruth S. Intress, Snubs Alleged by Black Caucus; Gilmore: Minority Issues Not
Ignored, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 2000, at Al (discussing the Legislative Black
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felons must go through to regain their voting rights. However, the
new legislation does not apply to the restoration of other rights,
including the right to serve on a jury.95 Two years after the legis-
lation to restore voting rights passed, Governor Warner issued a
new policy that expedited the restoration of rights process for all
non-violent felons.96
A. The Current Restoration of Rights Process
Under Virginia's new restoration of rights process promulgated
by Governor Warner in 2002, those citizens convicted of non-violent
felonies are subject to an expedited review after applying for a
restoration of their rights.97 Those "convicted of violent felonies, a
drug manufacturing or distribution offense or an election law
offense" are required to apply under the traditional restoration of
rights process.9" Under the expedited review process for non-violent
felons, an applicant will be notified of the Governor's decision to
grant or deny the restoration of rights request within six months.99
There is no time frame for when the Governor will act on an
application to restore civil rights for those convicted of violent
felonies, a drug-related offense, or election fraud.
Although non-violent felons are assured the Governor will take
action on their restoration of rights application within six months
of filing a completed application, the applicants are still required to
wait three years upon finishing their sentence (including parole)
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); see Bob Gibson, Group
Helping Ex-Felons Regain Their Voting Rights, RIcHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 28, 2000,
at B2 (noting that due to the difficulty of the voting rights process, even after the passage of
the new law, some officials and convicted felons who have had their voting rights restored
started the Voting Rights Committee to offer free assistance to those convicted felons trying
to regain their voting rights).
96. Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7 (providing non-violent felons a
shortened process" to apply to have their civil rights restored by the Governor).
97. Id.
98. Id. (noting that felons not eligible for the shortened process should contact the
Secretary of the Commonwealth to receive information on the correct process).
99. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Restoration of Rights Letter (2002), available at
http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/Clemency/rorLetter2002.doc (describing the basic
requirements for non-violent felons wishing to have their civil rights restored).
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before they can become eligible. 00 During the three year period, the
applicant must be free from both subsequent felony and misde-
meanor convictions.'0 The decision of the Governor to deny a
petition is final and may not be appealed. 1 2 However, a non-violent
felon may re-apply two years after a denial. 1 3
The application for non-violent felons is a one-page form,
designed to be easier for applicants to complete than the lengthy
application required for those convicted of violent felonies.' 4 The
form is issued by the Secretary of the Commonwealth' 5 and the
Director of the Department of Corrections is required to notify a
convicted felon of the restoration of rights application process.' 6
The form asks for basic identification information as well as for
information about the felonies and any misdemeanors of which the
applicant has been convicted. 1°' Specifically, the applicant must
identify each felony and misdemeanor conviction along with the
name of the court where the conviction occurred and the date of the
conviction.'0 8
100. Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7 (including, in addition to parole,
any suspended sentence or probation).
101. Id. (requiring all court costs or fines to be paid as well).
102. Id. (noting a restoration of rights is at the Governor's discretion).
103. Id. (permitting an applicant to re-apply although initial denial is a result of the
applicant providing false information).
104. Id. Only half of the one page form requires the applicant to supply information; the
remaining half of the form is an affidavit which the applicant must sign in the presence of
a public notary.
105. See Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Clemency (2005), available at http://www.
commonwealth.virginia.gov/Clemency/clemency.cfm [hereinafter Clemency).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (requiring the Director of the
Department of Corrections to notify a convicted felon regarding the loss of his civil rights as
well as the process required of the felon in order to regain those rights upon completion of
the felon's sentence).
107. See Clemency, supra note 105 (requesting identification information such as name
when convicted, both home and mailing addresses, both work and home phone numbers, date
of birth, and social security number).
108. See id. (requiring the applicant to attach additional pages if necessary as the form
only provides space for listing one felony).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The restoration of rights process for those convicted of violent
felonies, drug-related offenses,' °9 or election fraud,'O is more
complicated. Unlike those convicted of non-violent felonies, there is
no expedited review process and the application is more lengthy and
cumbersome. Additionally, while the application's instructions state
that the applicant does not need the services of an attorney to
petition the Governor, the application is over three times the length
of the non-violent application."'
Specifically, the application requires the submission of several
documents along with the completion of a two-page form." 2 The
requested documents include: certified copies of the applicant's
felony court orders and sentencing orders, certified copies noting
fines and court cost payment, a letter of petition, a letter from the
applicant's probation officer or parole officer defining the applicant's
supervision period, a copy of the applicant's pre- and post- sentenc-
ing report, three reference letters from reputable community
members who can attest to the applicant's good character, and a
personal letter in which the applicant can demonstrate how his life
has changed and why he believes his civil rights should be
restored."' The application also asks for identification information,
including the applicant's former prison number and the name
under which the state convicted the applicant."4 The applicant
must have completed any probation period, or finished with a
suspended sentence, five years before applying to have his civil
109. Those convicted of drug-related offenses as defined in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-248,
-248.01, -248.1, -255, -255.2, -258.02 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) are not eligible for an
expedited review.
110. Those convicted of election fraud as defined in VA. CODEANN. § 24.2-1016 (West 2001
& Supp. 2004) are not eligible for an expedited review.
111. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Application and Instructions for Restoration of Civil
Rights, available at httpJ/www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/Clemency/restore.pdf(last visited
Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Application and Instructions]. The application includes seven pages
of instructions and supplemental information. Id. In contrast, the shortened application
process for non-violent felons includes a half page of instructions and supplemental
information. See Application for Restoration, supra note 7.
112. Application and Instructions, supra note 111 (requiring the applicant to address
nineteen requests and to have the form notorized).
113. Id. The personal letter should also list community activities in which the applicant
is involved.
114. Id. (including convictions in other states).
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rights restored. 1 5 Once the application is complete, the applicant is
to return it to the Secretary of the Commonwealth. 1 6
As with non-violent felons, those convicted of a violent felony,
a drug-related offense, or election fraud are to be notified by the
state of the loss of their civil rights and the process through which
they may regain those rights."' However, unlike with non-violent
offenders, there is no guarantee that the Governor will review other
applicants' petitions in a timely manner."18 Since the Governor has
the sole authority to grant a restoration of rights, and there is no
law mandating the Governor to act upon an application within a
specified period of time, those felons not eligible for the shortened
restoration of rights process may never regain their civil rights,
including the right to serve on a jury, even though they have met
the application requirements." 9
B. Regaining the Right to Vote
Like Governor Warner's distinction between non-violent felons
and those felons convicted of violent crimes, drug-related crimes, or
election fraud crimes, the General Assembly promulgated new
legislation in 2000 expediting the process to regain the right to vote,
distinguishing between the same categories of felons. 2 ' Non-violent
felons, only wishing to regain their right to vote, can petition the
115. Id. In comparison, non-violent felons must be free from probation, parole, or a
suspended sentence, for three years. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7.
116. Application and Instructions, supra note 111.
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.1 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004). The Secretary of the
Commonwealth is required to inform all applicants of both the dates upon which the
Secretary received a complete application and the date the application was forwarded to the
Governor. Id. The Secretary is required to forward completed applications "within ninety
days after receipt." Id.
118. The short application for non-violent offenders specifically states that "[plersons who
have been convicted of a violent offense, a drug manufacturing offense or distribution offense
or an election law offense are not eligible for this process." Application for Restoration of
Rights, supra note 7.
119. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (stating that the Governor has the authority "to remove
political disabilities"). The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that under the Virginia
Constitution, the Governor is the only political actor with the authority ultimately to grant
or to deny a removal of a felon's "political disabilities." In Re Iris Lynn Phillips, 574 S.E.2d
270, 273 (Va. 2003).
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (describing the expedited
review process for the restoration of the right to vote).
2005] 2127
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
circuit court, who then make a recommendation to the Governor on
whether to grant or deny the right to vote."'2 In addition, the law
requires the Governor to act on the circuit court's recommendation
within ninety days of the court's decision.'22
The law establishes guidelines for non-violent felons petitioning
the circuit courts to have their right to vote restored. Specifically,
the law requires that the applicant demonstrate "civil responsibility
through community or comparable service; and that the petitioner
has been free from criminal convictions, excluding traffic infrac-
tions" during the five-year period following sentence completion. 2 '
The circuit court serves as a screening mechanism, which can
accelerate the application process. 24 If the circuit court approves
the non-violent felon's application, the order is sent to the Secretary
of the Commonwealth, who in turn submits the order to the
Governor, who has ninety-days to grant or deny the petitioner's
right to vote. 25 If the circuit court denies the application, the felon
still may apply directly to the Governor to have his eligibility to
vote restored, but the Governor is not required to act upon it within
ninety days of its receipt.'26 By giving non-violent felons the option
of first applying to the circuit courts, the current law ensures that
those felons who are eligible to have their voting rights restored will
have an expedited review of their application.
The current law was passed in 2000 largely in response to harsh
criticism of the previous restoration of rights process. Before the
voting restoration legislation and the restoration of rights process
implemented by Governor Warner in 2002, all felons had only the
121. Id.; see also Phillips, 574 S.E.2d at 273 (holding that the screening of petitions by
circuit courts does not constitute a separation of powers violation as the Governor has the
ultimate authority to grant or to deny a petition).
122. Id. (requiring the court to submit an order to the Secretary of the Commonwealth,
who must forward the order to the Governor).
123. Id. For non-violent felons wishing to have all of their rights restored, the wait to
apply is three years after sentence completion. See Application for Restoration of Rights,
supra note 7.
124. Phillips, 574 S.E.2d at 273 (finding the circuit courts' limited role is to determine
"whether a petitioner has presented competent evidence supporting the specified statutory
criteria"); see Gibson, supra note 95, at B2 (describing the law as establishing a "screening
process").
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004).
126. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; see also Phillips, 574 S.E.2d at 273 (noting that a felon
is not obliged to petition the circuit court, but may directly petition the Governor).
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option of applying directly to the Governor to have their civil rights
restored, and the Governor did not have to act on the application
within any time frame.'27 Critics of this direct application process
argued that the difficulty of the process discouraged felons from
applying to have their voting rights restored. 128 Furthermore, less
than eight percent of restoration of rights applications were granted
in the twenty-five years prior to the enactment of the current law,
which expedites the restoration of non-violent felons' voting right.129
The current law applies only to non-violent felons wishing to
restore their voting rights. 3 ° To restore other rights, including the
right to serve on a jury, all felons must apply to the Governor.' 3 '
Although the Governor has instituted a quicker, easier process for
non-violent felons wishing to have all their rights restored, the
circuit courts do not serve as a screening mechanism for applicants
unless they only wish to restore their right to vote. 3 2 Thus, even if
a non-violent felon petitions the circuit court, the court recommends
the felon's voting rights be restored, and the Governor grants the
right to vote, the non-violent felon would still be required to fill out
a restoration of rights application through the Secretary of the
Commonwealth's office in order to be eligible to regain other civil
rights, including the right to serve on a jury."' Additionally, if a
non-violent felon wishes to petition the circuit court to regain the
right to vote, the felon must wait at least five years after completing
his sentence.' However, if the felon wishes to regain all of his civil
rights, including the right to vote, he may apply directly to the
Governor after three years."'
127. Id. (instilling the Governor with authority "to remove political disabilities").
128. See Gibson, supra note 95, at B2 (noting the lack of criteria to petition the Governor).
129. Id. (finding less than five thousand applicants had their rights restored before 2000).
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004). Those convicted of violent
felonies, drug offenses, or election fraud are excluded.
131. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)
(limiting the statute's applicability to those wishing to have their voting rights restored).
132. See VA. CODEANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (limiting the circuit courts
in their ability to screen applicants who wish to have only their right to vote restored).
133. See id. To restore "political disabilities" other than the right to vote, the applicant
must petition the Governor. VA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (requiring the applicant to
have completed any service, finish probation or parole five years prior to applying).
135. Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7. As Governor Warner has made
the restoration of rights process simpler for all convicted of non-violent felonies, it would
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C. Newly Proposed Legislation to Amend the Process to Regain
the Right to Vote in Virginia
Although the current law is an improvement upon regaining the
right to vote, it should also encompass the other rights a felon loses
upon conviction, such as the right to serve on a jury. In addition,
the wait to apply should either mirror the Governor's policy of
three years after completion of sentence, or make the wait shorter
than three years. Delegate Jerrauld Jones, who proposed the 2000
legislation expediting the process for non-violent felons wishing to
regain the right to vote, argues that additional changes to the
current law could make the law more effective. 3 ' Jones proposed
new legislation in 2002, applicable only to those felons petitioning
for their right to vote, that would permit non-violent felons to
petition the circuit court immediately upon the completion of
their sentence.'37 However, the bill was not passed before the end
of the General Assembly session. In 2003, the House Privileges
and Elections Committee passed a proposal for a constitutional
amendment that would give the General Assembly power to
establish a process whereby felons' rights could be restored, but the
Committee voted down the proposed constitutional amendment in
2004.138 In the opening of the 2005 session of the Virginia General
seem unlikely that non-violent felons would utilize the process established in VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) to have their voting rights restored, when they could
have all their rights restored two years sooner. Indeed Virginia's Department of Planning
and Budget has noted that only two of 1,403 restoration of rights applicants since 2000 have
utilized the statutory process to regain voting rights in VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West
2001 & Supp. 2004). Virginia Legislative Information System, Department of Planning and
Budget, 2005 Fiscal Impact Statement, available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.
exe?051+oth+HB2755F122+PDF (describing the fiscal impact H.B. 2755 would create by
amending VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)).
136. See Gibson, supra note 95, at B2 (noting that Jones's statement that he would like
to eliminate the five-year waiting period so that those convicted of non-violent felonies could
immediately apply to have their rights restored).
137. H.B. 60,2002 Leg. (Va. 2002) (proposing to amend VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West
2001 & Supp. 2004) by eliminating the five-year waiting period for non-violent felons
petitioning to have their right to vote restored).
138. Tyler Whitley, Panel Reverses on Voting Rights for Felons, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 2004, at A6 (noting that the House Privileges and Election Committee,
which had previously supported a constitutional amendment that would have given the
General Assembly power to establish a process whereby felons could regain their rights,
overwhelmingly disapproved of the measure in 2004).
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Assembly, Delegate Fenton Bland, Jr. introduced a bill similar to
the bill proposed by Delegate Jerrauld Jones. 3 s Delegate Bland's
bill would have eliminated the five-year waiting period for non-
violent felons wishing to have their right to vote restored.'40 The bill
was referred to the House Courts of Justice Committee but did not
make it out of committee before the end of the 2005 session. 14
1
The failed legislation would have expedited the restoration of
voting rights process for those convicted of committing a non-violent
felony. However, the failed legislation would not have eliminated
many of the problems associated with the current legislation. For
example, the failed legislation would not have allowed those
convicted of violent felonies, drug offenses, or election fraud to apply
for a restoration of their voting rights under the expedited
process. 4 2 Consequently, the failed legislation would have affected
only those convicted of non-violent felonies, a group that already
has a simplified application process under the current legislation 14
3
and Governor Warner's policy.
44
While the failed legislation would have improved upon current
legislation allowing non-violent felons an expedited process to
restore their voting rights, the failed legislation would not have
applied to other civil rights, such as the right to serve on a jury. The
failed legislation would have benefitted those non-violent felons
wishing to vote, but would not have allowed the felons to regain the
rest of their rights. Thus, both the current and failed legislation
place voting rights above other civil rights, as felons are required to
go through a separate process to regain the rest of their civil rights.
139. H.B. 2755, 2005 Leg. (Va. 2005) (proposing to amend VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2
(West 2001 & Supp. 2004) by eliminating the five-year waiting period for non-violent felons
petitioning to have their right to vote restored).
140. Id. Delegate Bland introduced this bill days before resigning from the General
Assembly after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Jeffrey Kelley, Delegate
Resigns After Guilty Plea; Fenton L. Bland Jr. Had Committed Fraud to Fund Funeral
Home, Officials Say, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2005, at Al.
141. The Virginia Legislative Information System lists H.B. 2755 as failing in the House
Courts of Justice Committee. Virginia General Assembly, Legislative Information System,
Failed Legislation, available at http://www.leg.l.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?.051+com+
H8N06 (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
142. See H.B. 2755,2005 Leg. (Va. 2005). The bill only amends the current legislation with
respect to time restraints placed on the applicant.
143. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004).
144. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7.
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Particularly with respect to the right to serve on a jury, neither the
current or failed legislation benefits the African American commu-
nity, where a quarter of the male population has been convicted of
a felony,'45 as it will not enable more African Americans convicted
of felonies to serve on juries.
IV. A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE RESTORATION OF RIGHTS
PROCESS
While this Note focuses on Virginia's felony exclusion law, the
majority of states also exclude felons from serving on juries.'46
Virginia, therefore, is a microcosm of national practice toward
felons, as most states impose collateral sanctions upon felons
reintegrating into society,'4 including stripping felons of the right
to serve as jurors. This Part will highlight national trends in felon
exclusion from juries using Virginia as a comparative benchmark.
In addition, this Part will address the policy concerns of felon
exclusion laws focusing on individualized treatment during criminal
proceedings and felon reintegration into society.
A. National Trends
Laws restricting juror qualifications have become less restrictive
since the 1940s when the Supreme Court began requiring that
juries be selected from a fair cross-section of the community.'4
145. See Restore Your Right to Vote, supra note 9 (noting that twenty-five percent of black
males in Virginia are disenfranchised due to felony convictions).
146. For a national view on felony disenfranchisement laws and their effect on jury
service, see Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65,
65 (2003) (noting that "[thirty-one states and the federal government subscribe to the
practice of lifetime felon exclusion"). See also Joseph H. Kelley, Note, Restoration of Deprived
Rights, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 924, 926-30 (1969) (describing common rights lost by felons
under state laws, including the right to serve on a jury); Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner
Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 509-10 (1999) (listing jury exclusion as
one of eight common civil penalties imposed on felons after serving their sentences).
147. See Sabra Micah Barnett, Commentary, Collateral Sanctions and Civil Disabilities:
The Secret Barrier to True Sentencing Reform for Legislatures and Sentencing Commissions,
55 ALA. L. REV. 375, 379-80 (2004) (arguing that civil disabilities imposed upon felons
released back into society disrupt the integration process and unfairly impose additional
penalties upon felons who have already completed their sentences).
148. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (requiring juries to be drawn from
a fair cross-section of the community); Kalt, supra note 146 at 186-88 (arguing that jury
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Unlike other juror qualification laws, laws restricting felons from
serving as jurors have not become less restrictive, but have
remained static.'49 Jurisdictions applying felon exclusion laws fall
into three general categories. 5 ' The vast majority of states exclude
felons for life-meaning felons are forever prohibited from serving
as jurors, or prohibited until they apply for and receive a restora-
tion of their rights from the state.' 5 ' Other states bar felons from
serving as jurors while they are imprisoned, and during the
subsequent supervisory period after release, but permit juror
service upon successful completion of probation. 5 2 Some states
exclude felons from serving as jurors only during the time the felon
is imprisoned.'53
Virginia is included in the majority of states that exclude felons
from serving as jurors for life.'54 Of the states that exclude felons
from serving as jurors, there are different methods states prescribe
to restore the rights denied to felons, including the right to serve on
a jury.'55 These methods include restoration: 1) by clemency, where
the head of the state government grants a pardon or officially
restores lost rights;156 2) by statute, where the law requires certain
lost rights to be restored at certain times;'57 3) through a decree of
composition has become more diverse since the 1940s as more people are participating as
jurors).
149. Kalt, supra note 146, at 187 (noting that the practice of excluding felons from serving
as jurors "represents an exception to general trends of liberalization concerning civil
disabilities").
150. See id. at 149 app. 1 (providing an analysis of felon exclusion laws from all fifty
states).
151. Id. at 149-50 (noting that thirty-one states and the federal government bar felons
from serving as jurors for life).
152. Id. (including time served in prison, on probation, or parole); see also Petersilia, supra
note 146, at 510 (finding that ten states exclude felons from jury service while the felon is
serving his sentence, and four states exclude felons for a period between one and four years
following sentence completion).
153. Kalt, supra note 146, at 150 (allowing felons to serve as jurors upon completion of a
prison sentence).
154. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-338 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (naming felons as a class
disqualified from serving as jury members).
155. See Kelley, supra note 146, at 930-32 (describing four different methods states use
to restore rights felons lose by law due to their status).
156. Id. at 930 (noting that clemency is the most common method states use to restore
rights, and that clemency includes many different forms including pardon or amnesty).
157. Id. at 930-31 (providing an example of rights being restored through a statute
endowing a felon with the rights lost at conviction when the felon completes his sentence).
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an adjudicative body, such as a parole board; 5 ' or 4) through a
combination of the above.'59 Virginia falls into the "clemency"
category, as only the Governor has the right to restore a felon's
rights. 6 ° Virginia permits a combination approach, however, with
respect to restoring felons' right to vote, as the law permits circuit
courts to review petitions for the right to vote and submit recom-
mendations to the Governor.'
B. National Policy Concerns Regarding Felon Exclusion Laws
Instead of reentering society with their debt paid, felons reenter
society with penalties they may continue to pay for the rest of their
lives, as they are often denied the right to vote, run for public office,
or serve on a jury.'62 After completing their sentence, most felons
are unaware of the collateral sanctions associated with their
conviction.'63 For example, a young first-time offender is more
likely to accept a guilty plea in order to avoid a prison sentence.
64
158. Id. at 931 (describing the power of certain administrative agencies or courts to restore
a lost right).
159. Id. at 931-32 (noting that some states use a combination of procedures to restore
rights, such as having an administrative agency recommend to an executive official that a
right be restored).
160. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (providing the Governor with the sole authority "to
remove political disabilities").
161. In Virginia, a combination approach is used to restore the right to vote under VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004), as the circuit court is given authority to
recommend to the Governor that a felon's right to vote be restored.
162. Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REv. 255, 273 (2004) (describing the experience of many felons who are unaware of
the collateral consequences that accompany their conviction, including the right to vote or
serve on ajury). Although beyond the scope of this Note, the American Bar Association (ABA)
proposes that collateral sanctions should be limited and imposed sparingly, subject to review
by a judge. In addition, the ABA encourages judges to take into account collateral sanctions
that operate by law when sentencing. See generally Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J.
Chin, Old Wine in a New Skin: The ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions and
Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 232 (2002).
163. Thompson, supra note 162, at 272-23 (listing common consequences of a felony
conviction and stressing the lack of awareness of these consequences by both criminal
defendants and judges).
164. Andrew Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, THE AM. PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 60-62
(discussing the lack of knowledge about felony exclusion laws and providing a hypothetical
describing how defendants unknowingly give up their right to vote by accepting a plea).
Critics of ending felony disenfranchisement laws point to the fact that their opponents focus
solely on the loss of the right to vote, not the loss of other rights-including the right to serve
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Only later when he is denied from serving on a jury or turned away
at the voting booth may he become aware of the full extent of his
guilty plea.
The rationale for the exclusion of felons from juries stems from
the belief that felons are less trustworthy and would be unable to
administer the law fairly.'65 However, this view is inconsistent with
the idea of reintegration and rehabilitation, both of which are
interests of the state.'66 Jury service is a forum that provides the
ultimate in representative government, as it allows community
members collectively to decide important issues within the commu-
nity.'67 By excluding felons that have served their sentences from
participating injuries, felons are marginalized within the commu-
nity. 8 The marginalization of felons from their communities due
to collateral consequences, such as jury exclusion, impedes the
ability of felons to transition back into society as they are denied a
stake in what happens in their communities.
169
on a jury-indicating that the advocacy is disingenuous as the focus on disenfranchisement
suggests winning votes for the liberal agenda is more important than securing actual rights.
See Glenn Richardson & Jerry Keen, Push to Let Felons Vote a Simple Power Ploy, THE
ATLANTA-J. CONST., Oct. 18, 2004, at 11A. Indeed, when Virginia amended its restoration
of rights process in 2000, the abbreviated procedure applied only to those seeking to regain
the right to vote. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (establishing a
shortened procedure to have the right to vote restored, but leaving the lengthy procedure to
have other rights restored intact).
165. See Nora V. Demleitner, Symposium, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 158-59
(1999) (analogizing the state's treatment of felons to groups historically excluded from
political participation, including women and minorities).
166. See Petersilia, supra note 146, at 511 (noting that states spend millions of dollars on
rehabilitation programs to help felons ease into society upon release, yet also impose
collateral sanctions upon offenders that impinge upon the goal of rehabilitative services).
167. Although focusing on civil juries, Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 29,54-55 (1994), equates jury participation to a parliament, where people
come together to decide issues for the community.
168. See Thompson, supra note 162, at 273 (arguing that collateral sanctions, such as
denial of the right to serve on a jury, serve as a barrier to felons' successful reintegration into
society as they are separated from non-felons in exercising their rights as citizens).
169. Depriving felons of the right to vote or the right to serve on a jury through a
collateral sanction is a denial of the most basic forms of representative government. See
Barnett, supra note 147, at 383 (noting that collateral sanctions impede integration into
society and encourage recidivism).
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V. ASSESSING THE CURRENT LAW FROM A CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
PERSPECTIVE
A. Felons as Jurors in Criminal Cases
Under Governor Warner's policy, Virginians convicted of non-
violent felonies can become eligible to serve on a jury three years
after their conviction. Violent felons, drug offenders, and those
convicted of election fraud also have the opportunity to apply for a
restoration of civil rights and thus may become eligible for jury
service. According to Virginia prosecutors who were ordered by a
circuit court to refrain from criminal record or driver history checks
on prospective jurors, however, all felons should be kept out of the
jury box.'° The state's policy argument is based on the premise that
a convicted felon may be sympathetic toward a criminal defendant
and thus may not be able to serve impartially as a juror.1'1 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has ruled that the Sixth Amendment requires
that a jury be impartial for both the accused and the state.'72
Additionally, the Virginia Court Rules require trial courts to
determine whether a jury member can serve impartially as to both
the defendant and the Commonwealth. 3 Thus, as the government
would argue, the state has as much of a right to an impartial jury
as does the criminal defendant.'74
Given the government's right to an impartial jury and the their
belief that felons cannot serve impartially, the government argues
that felons should be excluded automatically from jury service.
Arguing that convicted felons are likely to be biased against the
170. See Memorandum Re: Use of Jury Lists (Va. Cir. Ct. Loudoun County June 2, 1998)
(arguing that felons are inherently biased toward the state).
171. Id. (noting that the state has a right to an impartial jury).
172. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,483 (1990) (stating the impartiality goal of the Sixth
Amendment is applicable to both the accused and the state).
173. VA. CT. R. 3A: 14 (requiring the court to examine prospective jurors to determine if
any would be unable to provide an impartial adjudication); see also VA. CONST. art. I, § 8
(stating that the accused in criminal prosecutions has a right to an impartial jury).
174. See Lance Salyers, Invaluable Tool vs. Unfair Use of Private Information: Examining
Prosecutors' Use of Jurors' Criminal History Records in Voir Dire, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1079, 1081 (1999) (arguing that background checks of prospective jurors should be permitted
to ensure both the state and the defendant receive a fair trial).
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Commonwealth, the government claims that having felons serve
as jury members would unduly burden the Commonwealth in trying
to obtain a conviction against a criminal defendant. 7 ' Excluding
felons from juries, however, is unnecessary for the government to
achieve its purpose of having an impartial jury, given the state's
ability to use peremptory strikes and strikes for cause during the
voir dire process. Lastly, the government's argument, without foun-
dation, assumes that all felons hold thoughts of prejudice toward
the state.
1. The State's Policy Ignores Existing Court Rules That Remove
Biased Jurors
Disallowing convicted felons to serve as jury members may be
unnecessary, as any jury member who is biased may be struck for
cause by the judge or by use of a peremptory strike. During voir
dire, the judge and attorneys have the right to examine prospective
jury members, particularly to discover if the prospective jury
member has "expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any
bias or prejudice therein."17 Any party who objects to a prospective
jury member for fear of the juror's bias can introduce evidence to
support the objection and can have the jury member removed by
the court for cause.'77 The government, therefore, can object to a
prospective jury member who had been convicted previously of a
felony if the jury member has indicated any sort of prejudice toward
the state. If the judge finds the convicted felon does harbor some
bias, the judge must excuse the jury member.
Furthermore, the government in criminal prosecutions, the
plaintiff in civil actions, and the defendant in either setting are
entitled to strike prospective jury members for no cause during voir
dire until the appropriate number of jury members remain. 7 ' In a
Virginia felony case, twenty prospective jury members are sum-
175. See Memorandum Re: Use of Jury Lists (Va. Cir. Ct. Loudoun County June 2, 1998)
(contending that a denial to conduct background checks on prospective jurors would create
a jury impartial to the state).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (West 2003) (providing the court and counsel for both
parties the right to examine prospective jurors).
177. Id. (requiring the court to conclude the prospective juror is not indifferent).
178. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262 (West 2003) (permitting each party to strike a certain
number of prospective jurors for no cause).
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moned for service and examined during voir dire.'79 Twelve jurors
are then required to serve as the jury."0 Therefore, each party may
peremptorily strike up to four prospective jurors. If a felon serving
as a prospective juror does not demonstrate any prejudice toward
the government and is not struck for cause, the government still
has the option of striking the juror by using a peremptory strike.
Due to the highly unlikely chance that more than four prospective
jurors in a criminal trial would be convicted felons, the government
still can achieve its goal of eliminating convicted felons from the
jury box through the usual voir dire process.
Although Virginia prosecutors can use their peremptory strikes
to excuse convicted felons from the jury box, the Supreme Court
requires that a jury be selected from a fair cross-section of the
community.181 Thus, an outright prohibition on felons serving as
jury members may violate the three-prong fair cross-section test
laid out in Duren v. Missouri.'82 Under Duren, in any criminal case
the state cannot deny the accused his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights if the accused can show that felons are a distinct
group, that felons' representation in the jury box is unfair and
unreasonable in comparison with the percentage of felons in the
community, and that this unfair and unreasonable representation
of felons in the jury box is due to the state's systematic exclusion of
felons from the jury selection process.' 83 The use of strikes for cause
and peremptory strikes, therefore, may be the only constitutionally
sound way to ensure that both the state and the defendant each
have an impartial jury.
179. Id. (requiring twenty prospective jurors to be called for a felony case).
180. Id. (requiring twelve jurors to serve as a jury in a felony case).
181. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,527 (1975) (requiringjuries to be drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community).
182. 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section
requirement, the allegedly excluded group must be distinct in the community; the number
of people in this group in the overall community as compared with the number of people
serving on juries must be unfair and unreasonable; and the underrepresentation of this
distinct group in the jury pool must be due to the state's systematic exclusion. Id.
183. See id.
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2. The State's Policy Assumes All Convicted Felons Are Biased
The government's belief that convicted felons are likely to be
biased jury members may be an overstatement. For instance, a
jury member who previously had been convicted of selling mari-
juana would, in all likelihood, be able to consider impartially the
conviction of someone accused of rape. The government's fear of
bias hinges on the idea that all convicted felons share a sort of
camaraderie with those accused of any kind of crime. Research by
psychologists Tom R. Tyler and Yuen J. Huo, however, suggests
otherwise.'84 Tyler and Huo's research indicates that acceptance of
legal decisions is shaped by personal views of procedural fairness
and observation of an authority figure's motive.'85 In their study,
they asked respondents to consider their personal experience with
law enforcement and the courts and whether the outcome of the
proceedings was fair. Over seventy percent of the respondents
indicated they thought law enforcement and the courts followed fair
procedures and that they had been treated fairly.8 6 Therefore,
those convicted of felonies called to serve as jury members are not
likely to associate their conviction with a universal belief that all
criminal defendants are being treated unfairly by the state.
B. Felons as Jurors in Civil Cases
Even if the government's argument that non-violent offenders,
violent offenders, drug offenders, and election fraud offenders
serving on juries would bias the jury against the government in a
criminal case were well-founded, the government's argument is
significantly less persuasive when it comes to banning convicted
felons from serving on jury trials in civil cases. In a civil proceeding,
a jury is not required but may be requested by either party or by
184. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002) (studying societal attitudes toward law
enforcement and courts).
185. Id. at 49-50, 58-59 (questioning those who had been involved with a police or court
proceeding).
186. Id. at 53. Sixty-two percent of those surveyed believed they received the outcome they
deserved, while sixty-six percent perceived the outcome as fair under the law. Id.
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the court.187 If a jury is requested, both parties have the right to
examine prospective jury members during voir dire in order to
determine if any prospective juror is harboring bias toward either
party that would prevent him from serving impartially."' 8 As in a
criminal proceeding, each side may question prospective jurors
regarding prejudice and may ask the judge to strike for cause those
harboring prejudice.18 Specifically, parties may ask prospective
jurors if they have "any interest in the cause, or ... expressed or
formed any opinion, or [are] sensible of any bias or prejudice."' 9° A
convicted felon, therefore, would be treated the same as other jury
members in a civil case in terms of whether the felon is harboring
bias that would make him unable to serve as a jury member.
Moreover, as in a criminal trial, parties in a civil proceeding are
entitled to peremptory strikes, whereby they can strike prospective
jurors from serving as jury members for virtually any reason. In
Virginia civil jury trials, up to thirteen prospective juror members
can be summoned, and each side may strike up to three prospective
jurors using their peremptory strikes.'9 ' Therefore, both parties
have the opportunity to prevent convicted felons from serving on
the jury using a peremptory strike in the event the felon did not get
struck for cause.
Unlike a criminal trial, there is no government entity for a felon
to harbor prejudice against during a civil proceeding. While a
convicted felon serving as a prospective juror could harbor preju-
dice against one of the parties, this bias will most likely manifest
itself during the voir dire process. A convicted felon serving as a
jury member in a civil proceeding, therefore, is not likely to be
harboring any more prejudice against one of the parties than any
other prospective jury member. Consequently, eliminating convicted
felons from civil jury service seems particularly unnecessary, as
each jury member's ability to serve impartially is dependent upon
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-336 (West 2003) (permitting the court to deny or to grant a
party's request for a jury in a civil trial).
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (West 2003) (allowing the court and parties to question any
prospective juror).
189. Id. (allowing the court or either party to question prospective jurors regarding
whether the prospective juror is related to any party or is harboring bias).
190. Id.
191. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-359, -360 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (describing the selection
process for jurors in civil trials).
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the specific issues involved in the civil proceeding, and not at all
upon their felony status.
192
C. Drug-Related Offenses and the Rate of Recidivism
Breaking down by race the percentage of prisoners confined for
drug offenses nationwide, a 1996 study by the Human Rights Watch
reported that African Americans compose nearly sixty-three per-
cent of those confined. 193 In Virginia, Governor Warner's policy
concerning restoration of civil rights excludes felons from applying
for expedited restoration of their civil rights if they have been
convicted of a drug-related offense, including manufacturing or
distributing drugs.' In addition, legislation to expedite the
restoration of voting rights excludes those convicted of a drug
offense.' 95 Mirroring national statistics, in Virginia, African
Americans compose the vast majority of those convicted of drug-
related charges.' 96 According to the Human Rights Watch, which
analyzed data presented to the Justice Department by Virginia in
1996, African Americans comprise more than eighty percent of
those serving jail sentences in the Commonwealth for a drug-
related crime.'97 Thus, the automatic ban on applying for an
expedited restoration of civil rights for those convicted of drug
related offenses disparately affects the African American commu-
nity with respect to jury composition, as the number of African
Americans eligible to vote, and thus eligible to serve as jurors, is
greatly diminished.
192. See Educ. Books, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 349 S.E.2d 903,905-06 (Va. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that impartiality in a civil case is dependent upon the particular circumstances and
issues in each individual case).
193. Human Rights Watch of the Sentencing Project, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial
Disparities in the War on Drugs pt. VI (2000), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/
Rcedrg0O-04.htm#P289_60230 (reporting that the "war on drugs" disproportionately affects
African Americans).
194. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (excluding those convicted of
drug offenses).
195. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7 (excluding those convicted of
drug offenses).
196. Steven A. Holmes, Race Analysis Cites Disparity in Sentencing for Narcotics, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2000, at A14 (reporting the findings of Human Rights Watch).
197. Id. (citing the study's prominent findings with respect to individual states).
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1. Distinctions Between Non-Violent, Violent, and Drug-
Related Felony Convictions
In fiscal year 2001, the Virginia Department of Corrections
reported that the Commonwealth was confining 4,549 prisoners for
drug-related offenses and expected 2,279 drug-related offense
prisoners as new court admissions in that year.198 In that report,
the Department of Corrections lists drug-related offenses below
non-violent and violent offenses in order of most serious offenses. 99
Yet both the current law, the failed legislation as to voting right
restoration, as well as Governor Warner's policy for restoration of
civil rights, treat felons convicted of drug offenses more harshly
than those convicted of non-violent felonies. Specifically, those
convicted of non-violent felonies have the opportunity to apply to
the Governor for a restoration of their civil rights three years after
sentence completion, through an expedited and simplified process,
whereas those convicted of drug offenses can only apply to the
Governor using a complicated process with no guarantee that any
action will be taken for such restoration.2 °0 Although the Depart-
ment of Corrections seems to define non-violent felonies as more
serious than drug offenses,20 ' both the current law and the proposed
legislation regarding voting rights, as well as Governor Warner's
policy, treat those convicted of drug-related felonies the same as
those convicted of violent felonies-that is, more harshly than those
convicted of non-violent felonies. Accordingly, those who have been
convicted of drug-related offenses cannot take advantage of the
expedited restoration of voting rights process available to those
convicted of non-violent felonies.
198. Va. Dep't of Corr., Facts & Figures, Annual Statistical Summaries, Population by
Most Serious Offense (2001), available at http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/
researchlstatsum_01/0loffense.htm [hereinafter Va. Dep't of Corr., Population by Most
Serious Offense]. The Virginia Department of Corrections reports that it is confining 29,196
inmates; ofthese, 19,262 are African Americans, and 18,082 are African American males. Va.
Dep't of Corr., Facts & Figures, Annual Statistical Summaries, Population by Gender & Race
(2001), available at httpJ/www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/research/statsum
0101gender.htm [hereinafter Va. Dep't of Corr., Population by Gender and Race].
199. Va. Dep't of Corr., Population by Most Serious Offense, supra note 198 (noting that
law enforcement considers drug offenses as being less serious than non-violent felonies).
200. See supra Part III (discussing the restoration of rights processes applicable to those
convicted of different types of felonies).
201. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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2. Rates of Recidivism
The harsh treatment of those convicted of drug-related offenses
may be related to recidivism rates associated with drug crimes. The
Virginia Department of Corrections tracked prisoners released in
1998 to determine whether the felons would become involved in
criminal activity again and thus be subject to re-incarceration.20 2
The study found that of those who recidivated, less than nine
percent of those convicted of non-violent felonies returned to prison,
while twenty-five percent of those convicted of drug related offenses
returned to prison." 3 The study also found that for those who
recidivate, most return to prison within two years of release.0 4
Despite the fact that those convicted of drug-related offenses
have a higher rate of recidivism, the exclusion of drug offenders
from Governor Warner's expedited review policy for restoring civil
rights is unnecessary. Governor Warner requires non-violent felony
applicants to be "free of any sentence, including any suspended
sentence, probation or parole for at least three years. ""' Thus, a
drug offender who engages in criminal activity within two years
after finishing his sentence for the drug offense would not be
eligible under Governor Warner's short application.20 6 The distinc-
tion between non-violent felons and felons convicted of drug related
offenses, therefore, is unwarranted and unduly burdens African
Americans as they constitute the vast majority of those felons
convicted of drug-related offenses.20 7
202. Va. Dep't of Corr., Study, Recidivism in Virginia: Tracking the 1998 Release Cohort,
14 INSIDE OuT 4 (2003), available at http://www.vacure.org/docs/vacurenl2003-08.pdf
(discussing the primary findings of the study) [hereinafter Va. Dep't of Corr., Tracking the
1998 Release Cohort]. The complete study can be found at VA. DEP'T OF CORR., RECIDIVISM
IN VIRGINIA: TRACKING THE 1998 RELEASE COHORT (2003), available at http://www.
vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/research/recidivism03.doc.
203. Va. Dep't of Corr., Tracking the 1998 Release Cohort, supra note 202.
204. See id. (finding that 8.9% recidivated in 1998, 38.5% in 1999, and 35.5% in 2000).
205. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7
(requiring an applicant to have a three-year clean record before applying).
206. Id.
207. See Holmes, supra note 196, at A14 (noting that African Americans constitute an
overwhelming portion of the population serving a sentence for a drug-related offense).
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VI. VIRGINIA JURY PROCEDURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
There are several constitutional issues that question the validity
of Virginia's current restoration of civil rights process. First, the
law may not meet constitutional muster, as the Supreme Court has
held that a criminal defendant must be offered a jury composed of
his peers in order to preserve the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right, through the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.2"8 Because Virginia's restoration of civil rights process has
such an adverse effect on the exercising of rights of the African
American community, it may result in purposeful discrimination
and may deny a criminal defendant a jury chosen from a represen-
tative community pool. Second, because prospective jurors are
screened for eligibility to vote and thus to serve on a jury, the
Commonwealth may be invading a felon's right to privacy if the
felon could show the prospective jury questionnaire was intrusive
and not relevant to the felon's ability to serve impartially.2"9
A. A Jury of One's Peers and Due Process
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment, through
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, requires
that a criminal defendant be offered a jury composed of his peers.2 '0
In Batson v. Kentucky, the prosecution used its peremptory strikes
to eliminate all four African American prospective jurors.21 ' In
response, the Supreme Court concluded that the state could not
so purposefully deny a specific race from serving on a jury.212 The
Court stressed that purposeful discrimination during venire
selection can occur under the guise of a neutral state statute,
208. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,308 (1879) (requiring juries to be composed
of peers of the accused).
209. See Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 361 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that
questions asked of prospective jury members must be non-biased and relevant to the case).
210. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (finding that eliminating all African
Americans from the jury box violated the African American defendant's right to equal
protection).
211. Id. at 83 (leaving a jury composed of only white members).
212. Id. at 86. The Court stated: "Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on
an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence
presented at a trial." Id. at 87.
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stating that "where the procedures implementing a neutral
statute operated to exclude persons from the venire on racial
grounds," the defendant is denied his right to equal protection.213
The Virginia statute forbidding convicted felons from serving as
jury members until their civil rights are restored is neutral on its
face. The law, however, has discriminatory effects, as it dispropor-
tionately impacts African Americans.21 4 In 2001, the Virginia
Department of Corrections' annual statistics confirmed that African
Americans compose approximately sixty-five percent of all con-
fined prisoners.21' Thus, African Americans are more likely to be
disproportionately applying to have their voting rights restored.
Even though African Americans compose nearly one-fifth of
Virginia's population,216 they are more than twice as likely as other
Virginia residents to be affected by the restoration of civil rights
process and thus to be denied the ability to serve on a jury.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of some
voter disenfranchisement laws. In Richardson v. Ramirez,21 7 the
Court upheld a California statute that denied voting rights to
felons.2"8 The Supreme Court interpreted Section 2 of the Four-
teenth Amendment as not guaranteeing convicted felons the right
to vote. 21 9 The Court also noted that states may take residence, age,
and criminal records into consideration when determining stan-
213. Id. at 88 (citation omitted) (disallowing any procedure where a specific race is
eliminated from serving as a juror).
214. See Pierre Thomas, Study Suggests Black Male Prison Rate Impinges on Political
Process, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1997, at A3 (citing a report by The Sentencing Project finding
that an estimated 1.46 million out of 10.4 million African American males nationwide are
ineligible to vote and, consequently, to serve on a jury in Virginia and many other states, due
to felony convictions).
215. Va. Dep't of Corr., Population by Gender and Race, supra note 198 (confirming that
African Americans compose the vast majority of confined inmates).
216. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Virginia Population Estimates by Sex, Race
and Hispanic or Latino Origin: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2002 (release date Sept. 18, 2003),
available at http'//www.census.gov/popest/archives/2000s/vintage_2002/ST-EST2002-ASRO-
05.html (providing population information by race and gender).
217. 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding the practice of denying felons voting rights).
218. Id. at 56 (allowing felon disenfranchisement when the laws are applied consistently).
219. Id. at 54. The Court relied on the language in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that the State may not deny the right to vote to any citizen,
except those who have participated "in rebellion, or other crime." Id. at 42 (alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2).
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dards for voter qualifications.22 ° Thus, the Court concluded that the
state did not deny the defendant equal protection of the law in
Ramirez.22'
Although the Court has validated some disenfranchisement laws
like that in Ramirez, it has also been willing to strike them down
on the basis of violating the Equal Protection Clause. In Hunter v.
Underwood,222 the Court held that a challenged section of the
Alabama State Constitution, which disenfranchised those convicted
of crimes of moral turpitude, violated the Equal Protection
Clause.223 The Court applied a two-prong test, which the opponent
of the state action must use to establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a racially neutral law violates the Equal Protection
Clause. First, the opponent of the law must show that the law has
had a racially discriminatory impact;22 and second, the opponent
must prove that the law was enacted for a racially discriminatory
purpose or with an intent to discriminate.225 Applying Hunter's
two-prong test, a convicted felon in Virginia could challenge the
restoration of civil rights process on equal protection grounds if he
shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the law is based on
a discriminatory purpose and that it disparately impacts the
African American community. The discriminatory purpose require-
ment may be easier to prove, because Virginia is a southern state.
As disenfranchisement laws have their roots in the Reconstruction
era, and as Virginia was a Jim Crow state,226 those challenging the
law could argue that the Commonwealth enacted the law under
purported legitimate reasons but with the actual intent to disen-
220. Id. at 53 (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51
(1959)) (finding that states may exclude some groups from voting).
221. Id. at 56 (holding that the state may uniformly deny felons the right to vote).
222. 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding that statutes restricting voting rights must not be
racially motivated).
223. Id. at 233 (finding the statute was enactedtorestrict AfricanAmericans from voting).
224. Id. at 227 (noting that a neutral law that has a disparate impact will be subject to
Equal Protection analysis).
225. Id. at 227-28 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-65 (1977)) (finding that where a law is neutral on its face, the law must be shown to be
racially motivated to violate the Equal Protection Clause).
226. For a history of race relations in Virginia during the Jim Crow period, see J. DOUGLAS
SMITH, MANAGING WHITE SUPREMACY: RACE, POLITICS, AND CITIZENSHIP IN JIM CROW
VIRGINIA (2002).
[Vol. 46:21092146
20051 A JURY OF ONE'S PEERS 2147
franchise African Americans.22 Disparate impact may be proven by
showing that the law denies one in four African Americans the right
to serve as a jury member.22
B. The Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy as a
penumbral right of the Ninth Amendment229 in Griswold v.
Connecticut."' When prospective jurors are called for jury service
in a criminal trial, the prosecution is afforded an opportunity to run
a criminal background check on all of them before the trial
begins.23' Through this process, the prosecution can eliminate
prospective jurors convicted of felonies.2"2 By prying into a prospec-
tive juror's history, however, the Commonwealth may be violating
the prospective juror's right to privacy.233
227. To prove the Commonwealth's discriminatory intent in determining eligibility forjury
service, challengers ofVirginia's restoration of voting rights process could point to the history
surrounding the law's enactment, under a totality of the circumstances test. Specifically, if
the law was originally enacted during the Jim Crow era, the history would serve as evidence
of the state's discriminatory intent. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 (stating that
historical background may be an evidentiary source to show discriminatory purpose).
228. See Felons File Lawsuit to Challenge Vote Law, supra note 9, at B2; Losing the Vote,
supra note 91, pt. III.
229. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, ofcertain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
230. 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding the right to privacy is an enumerated right of
the Ninth Amendment).
231. Salmon v. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 815, 818-19 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the
Commonwealth may obtain and review criminal background information on potential jurors).
In Salmon, the court relied on Virginia Code § 19.2-389(A)(1), which states that criminal
record information is to be circulated only among officers or employees of criminal justice
agencies. Salmon, 529 S.E.2d at 818-19. The Commonwealth may not run background checks
on prospective jurors in Loudon County. After the practice was challenged by a criminal
defendant, the Chief Justice of the twentieth circuit issued a procedural rule that prohibited
the use of jury lists for background checks. See Salyers, supra note 174, at 1084-87.
232. Salmon, 529 S.E.2d at 819. Salmon argued that the prosecution had an unfair
advantage in being able to remove prospective jurors who could be sympathetic toward him.
Id.; see also Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court
Policies and Procedures, 85 JUDICATURE 18,22-23 (2001); Salyers, supra note 174, at 1092-93.
233. The prosecution has the ability to screen prospective jurors through many different
forums, including the Virginia Crime Information Network and the Virginia Department of
Motor Vehicles. See Memorandum Re: Use of Jury Lists (Va. Cir. Ct. Loudoun County June
2, 1998).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Before actually being called to serve as a jury member, those on
the master jury list are asked to answer a questionnaire, which
asks if they have been convicted of a felony.234 In Brandborg v.
Lucas,235 the petitioner received a questionnaire for jury selection
that contained over one hundred questions.236 The petitioner failed
to answer twelve questions, submitting a note to the Judge that
she thought the questions to be of a "private nature" that had "no
relevance" to her ability to serve impartially.23 v Summoned to
service, the court instructed the petitioner to answer the questions
in writing and held the petitioner in contempt when she refused to
comply with the court's orders.238 Accepting the petitioner's writ of
habeas corpus challenging the contempt conviction, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that a
juror's right to privacy must be examined by weighing it against the
right of each party involved to an impartial jury.239 The Court held
that questionnaires must be screened to ensure each question asked
of the prospective juror is relevant to the case and is an unbiased
question.24 ° If relevance is established and the juror still objects to
the question on invasion of privacy grounds for fear of public
disclosure of private information, the juror should be instructed of
the option of having her answer recorded in camera in the presence
of only the judge and attorneys involved.24'
Under the District Court's logic, those convicted of felonies
could object to the relevance of their prior conviction in a court
proceeding. The court would have to weigh the interests of the
parties involved in determining whether the prospective juror's
right to privacy has been violated. In a criminal case, the court
would have to weigh the interest of the public, which may outweigh
234. Id. (describing the process where jury lists are created).
235. 891 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (requiring prospective jurors to answer questions
determined relevant, but requiring the court to provide the least intrusive way to comply).
236. Id. at 353.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 354-55.
239. Id. at 360 (requiring judges to determine the relevance of a question any time a
prospective juror evokes a privacy concern).
240. Id. (requiring courts to determine the relevance of all questions prior to the
questionnaires being submitted to prospective jurors).
241. Id. (requiring that the prospective juror be offered the least intrusive method of
responding).
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the prospective juror's privacy interest in keeping his felony
conviction unknown. In a civil case, however, there is no public
interest to weigh. Having a juror with a prior felony conviction is
irrelevant to a dispute between two community members, as the
parties involved are under no threat of state prosecution.
Theoretically, all convicted felons who have not had their civil
rights restored should be dismissed from the jury pool, based solely
on the questionnaire that would require the prospective juror to
indicate whether or not he had been convicted of a felony or had his
rights restored. However, many respondents do not correctly mark
their questionnaires, due to a lack of education or an inability to
understand the questions asked of them. These felons who slip past
the preliminary screening can then be called upon to serve as jury
members.242 Once erroneously called upon to serve, convicted felons
are subject to questioning by the judge and attorneys, as part of the
public record.2 43 Although felony convictions are public record,
felons who are erroneously summoned for jury duty are subject to
undue public attention when their past felony convictions become
known during the voir dire process.244 Being singled out for their
past crime in front of fellow community members, felons summoned
as prospective jurors consequently are punished by the Common-
wealth again, even though they have already completed their
sentence.245
CONCLUSION
Under Governor Warner's policy for restoring felons' civil rights,
as well as the system for felons wishing to restore only their right
242. As serving on ajury is a compulsory duty imposed on eligible citizens, those convicted
felons who incorrectly fill out their questionnaires prior to being called are not assumed to
be subverting the judicial system.
243. See Hannaford, supra note 232, at 24. Hannaford cites a 1991 study that found that
twenty-five percent ofjurors questioned during voir dire did not report their prior criminal
convictions or those of their family members when asked to do so in court. Id. at 23.
244. See Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous
Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 125 (1996) (noting that jury service exposes
jurors to "exploitation by the press, ... retaliatory threats, and unwanted attention").
245. See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial
Use of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895, 1898-99 (1999) (arguing that convicted felons are
treated as the "untouchables" of society and as "unreliable members of the democracy ...
banished from the political community").
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to vote under current Virginia law, the process is simplified for
those convicted of non-violent felonies.2 46 Even under the simplified
process, the earliest a felon may apply to restore his rights is three
years after completion of his sentence.24 v Virginia's General
Assembly should reform the entire restoration of rights process to
make it easier for all convicted felons to regain their civil rights.
Specifically, the distinction between non-violent felons and those
felons convicted of violent felonies, drug-related offenses, and
election fraud need to be eliminated so that all felons who have
served their sentences can enjoy the rights that the rest of Vir-
ginia's citizens enjoy. Currently, while non-violent felons are
guaranteed action by the Governor on their petition for a restora-
tion of their civil rights, those convicted of violent felonies are
required to fill out a longer and more complicated application with
no guarantee that the Governor will act on their application.248
Under this process, those felons ineligible for the shorter, expedited
review can be permanently denied civil rights although they have
served their sentence and remained crime-free.
The current restoration of rights process is particularly harsh on
the African American community. As a disproportionate number of
African American men are convicted felons-and therefore have lost
their civil rights, including the right to serve on a jury-jury pools
have a diminished number of eligible African American jurors. Due
to this diminished number of eligible African American jurors, an
African American criminal defendant may not be guaranteed a jury
of his peers due to the disparate impact the restoration of rights
process has on the African American community. 9
By making it easer for all felons to apply to have their civil rights
restored, more felons would become eligible for jury service. This
in turn would benefit Virginia's African American community, in
246. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7; VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2
(West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (stating the restoration of rights policy of the Governor and the
restoration of voting rights law, both of which have a simplified process for non-violent
felons).
247. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7. Only non-violent felons free
from any subsequent convictions are qualified to apply for a restoration of rights within three
years of the completion of their sentence. Id.
248. See Application for Restoration of Rights, supra note 7 (noting that the short form
application is only available for those convicted of non-violent felonies).
249. See supra Part N.A.
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which one in four men is a convicted felon. In addition, the jury
selection pool would become a more accurate reflection of Virginia's
communities, as more African Americans would become eligible for
jury service. These proposed changes to the restoration of civil
rights process would promote equal application of justice in all
trials, benefitting both African Americans specifically and Virginia's
population as a whole.
Amanda L. Kutz
